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1. Introduction
Switzerland represents a small share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
but is strongly engaged in meeting its abatement objectives and has proved to be 
at the forefront of international climate negotiations1. With 7.6 million inhabit-
ants, GHG emissions amounted 51.3 million tons of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2eq) 
in 2007, slightly down from the 1990 level (52.7 MtCO2eq). Since electricity is 
largely produced from hydro (56%) and nuclear (39%), transportation and hous-
ing are responsible for the major part of GHG emissions (see Figure 1).
Back in 1999, the Swiss Parliament adopted the Swiss CO2 Law (Swiss Con-
federation, 1999), which entered into force on May 1st 2000, aiming at a 10 per 
cent reduction of CO2 emissions below 1990 levels by 2010. Later, on July 9, 
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2 see Baranzani, Thalmann, and Gonseth (2004) for details about Swiss voluntary measures.
3 In line with Swiss Confederation (2007), we define combustible fuels as fuels used (a) to 
produce heat, (b) to generate electricity in thermal plants and (c) to operate facilities combin-
ing heat and power.
Figure 1: Sectoral Contributions to Swiss GHG Emissions (2007)
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2003, Switzerland ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change with the objective to reduce all GHG emissions by 8 
per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. The CO2 
Law encompasses various instruments in order to reach both of these objectives: 
(1) voluntary measures by the economy and individuals2, (2) a CO2 tax, if the 
voluntary measures are not effective enough, (3) measures taken in other policy 
areas having a positive impact on climate and (4) the exchange of emission allow-
ances and other flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. Special partial 
targets for combustible3 fuels (–15%) and transport fuels (–8%) have also been 
incorporated in the law. In 2007, the Federal Council has adopted an ordinance 
introducing an incremental CO2 tax on combustible fuels (Swiss Confedera-
tion, 2007). As of 2010, the level of this tax was increased from 24 to 36 CHF. 
Furthermore, among the voluntary measures by the industry, the “Climate Cent” 
initiative is worth mentioning (Swiss Federal Office of Energy, 2006; Nied-
erberger, 2005). Since October 2005, the Climate Cent Foundation is funded 
by a charge levied on all imports of petrol and diesel at a rate of 0.015 CHF per 
liter. The Foundation invests the proceeds into projects designed to reduce green-
house gas emissions both in Switzerland and abroad – using the flexibility mecha-
nisms of the Kyoto protocol: Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and Joint 
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Implementation (JI) – and is committed to reducing 12 MtCO2, of which at least 
2 MtCO2 in Switzerland, over the period 2008–2012.
In the framework of the revision of the Swiss CO2 Law for the post-2012 period 
and in view of the international negotiations taking place at the Conference of 
the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
the Swiss Government has proposed a set of instruments and two levels of abate-
ment to define the Swiss climate policy for the post-2012 period. The proposed 
policies are the results of a consultation procedure that took place until March 
2009 and has allowed major stakeholders and lobbies to defend their views and 
interests. We have to bear in mind that as Grossman and Helpman (2001) point 
out, the influence of lobby groups (e.g. business associations and environmental 
NGO’s) may be able to affect the behaviour of politicians. This can be accom-
plished by providing information, by financing election campaigns, or by bring-
ing environmental concerns to the forefront of the minds of the voters. It is com-
monly expected that the resulting policies from lobby pressure are not efficient. 
Under this pressure, governments tend to choose a policy that is a compromise 
between the efficient outcome and the lobbies’ most preferred policy level (Pers-
son and Tabellini, 2000).
As it is the case in the European Union (European Commission, 2009a), 
a first scenario is envisaged for the case where the climate negotiations would 
reach a moderate global abatement and a second more stringent scenario could 
be used in the case where the rest of the world would commit to strong emis-
sions reductions. A detailed description of the envisaged targets and instruments 
is presented in Section 3.
The use of multiple environmental policy instruments is often motivated by 
practical considerations of implementation and by the fact that the use of a 
single policy instrument (for example a tradable permit scheme) is rather diffi-
cult (Johnstone, 2003; Michaelowa, 2004). However it is important to verify 
that the emission reduction is achieved in an efficient way, i.e. that the marginal 
abatement cost are equalized across sectors or at least not too distant. With this 
in mind and taking into account the views expressed during the consultation pro-
cedure on the revision of the Swiss CO2 Law, the Swiss Government has devised 
policies composed of various instruments and sectoral targets, with the hope that 
they would be acceptable to the economy and the population. However, this mix 
of instruments and the resulting pressure from lobbies may not render an efficient 
solution. Then, we compare the use of these instruments with the implementa-
tion of a uniform carbon tax to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed policies. 
The implementation of a uniform carbon tax ensures that the marginal abate-
ment costs are equalized across sectors.
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4 The complete GEMINI-E3 represents the world economy in 28 regions (including Switzer-
land) and 18 sectors. All information about the model can be found at http://www.gemini-e3.
net, including its complete description (Bernard and Vielle, 2008).
5 Refers to the European Union Member States as of 2008.
6 Includes other European countries, Russia and the rest of the Former Soviet Union excluding 
Baltic States.
In order to adequately evaluate the post-2012 Swiss climate policies, model all 
the envisaged instruments and consider the influence of the choices that will be 
made in the rest of the world, we have coupled the GEMINI-E3 model, a world-
wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, with MARKAL-CHRES 
and MARKAL-CHTRA, two energy models describing respectively the Swiss 
residential and transportation sectors. This paper builds on the work undertaken 
in Sceia et al. (2009) and uses a new coupling approach to assess the climate 
policies currently under discussion.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly presents the methodology, 
Section 3 describes the baseline scenario. The policy scenarios and their respective 
results are presented respectively in Sections 4 and 5, whereas Section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
We use an aggregated version of GEMINI-E34, a dynamic-recursive CGE model 
with a highly detailed representation of indirect taxation, that represents the 
world economy in 6 regions and 18 sectors based on the year 2001. We define 
the regions as follows:
– CHE : Switzerland
– EUR : European Union5
– OEU : other European and Euro-Asian countries6
– JAP : Japan
– OEC : USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
– DCS : other countries, mainly developing countries
For Switzerland, we extend the number of sectors to 29 in order to more precisely 
present the transportation sector using the social accounting matrix (SAM) dis-
aggregation performed in Infras (2006). The structure of the Swiss nested CES 
production function and utility function, are presented in Figures 2 and 3. The 
elasticities used in the model are presented in Table 1.
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To complement the top-down model GEMINI-E3, we use the bottom-up models 
MARKAL-CHRES and MARKAL-CHTRA, which are energy models describ-
ing the Swiss residential energy system and the Swiss transportation energy 
system. They are submodules of a larger Swiss MARKAL model (SMM) devel-
oped at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI). The models contain respectively 173 
and 184 technologies using different energy sources (coal, oil, diesel, gasoline, 
gas, electricity, wood, pellets and district heat). Both MARKAL models use a 
3.5% discount rate (Amstalden et al., 2007). For a more detailed description of 
the models, see Schulz (2007) and Loulou and Labriet (2008).
Figure 2: Structure of the Swiss Nested CES Production Function
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a Present only in the production functions of transport sectors with the infrastructure corre-
sponding to the mode of transport, i.e. sector 12a for sectors 12b, 12c and 12d; sector 17b for 
sector 13; sector 17c for sector 14 and sector 17d for sectors 12e, 12f and 12g.
b Present only in the production functions of sectors 01, 02 and 03.
c Present only in the production function of sector 04.
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The harmonization or the integration of top-down and bottom-up models has 
been extensively studied but remains at the top of the agenda for researchers 
dealing with energy, environments and economy issues. Two main methods have 
been used. They are commonly referred to as soft-link and hard-link methods. 
While the first keep top-down and bottom up models separate, the later inte-
grates both in a single model. The application of these methods is not uniform 
and different models are linked or integrated in different ways. We have used a 
soft-link method that is different from those found in other studies. Drouet et 
al. (2005) use a MARKAL model of the Swiss residential sector to complement 
a CGE model in which the residential sector has been removed. We keep GEM-
INI-E3 and both MARKAL models in their complete form and dynamically 
couple them. Contrary to Schäfer and Jacoby (2005), we link the models both 
in the calibration and simulation phases. With regard to the hard-link method, 
most studies only integrate a reduced form of one of the models types. Examples 
include MARKAL-macro models, as used in Strachan and Kannan (2008), 
that integrate a simplified economic module in a bottom-up framework and CGE 
Figure 3: Structure of the Households’ Nested CES Utility Function
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Table 1: GEMINI-E3 Elasticities
Production function Consumption function 
Value 
Parameter Sector Value Parameter CHE other 
regions 
all regions ?hc 0.20 0.50 
? All 0.30 ?hres 0.00 0.80 
?pf 01 0.40 ?htra 0.10 0.50 
02, 03 0.20 ?hoth 0.30 0.30 
04 0.10 ?hrese 0.00 –
?pp All 0.10 ?htrag 0.80 – 
?e 01 to 05 0.10 ?htrap 0.50 0.50 
06, 07, 12, 13, 14 0.20 ?htrapp 0.50 – 
Others 0.40 ?htrapo 0.30 – 
?fe 01 to 04 0.10 ?htrapoo 0.30 – 
05 1.50 ?htrapooe 0.00 – 
06 to 11 & 15 to 18 0.90 ?htrao – 0.30 
Others 0.30 ?htraoe – 0.80 
?r All 0.60 
?m All 0.20 
?x 01,03 2.00 
2 10.00 
5 0.50 
12, 13, 14, 17 0.10 
18 0.05 
Others 3.00 
?mm All 0.20 
only for Switzerland 
?t All 0.10 
?r All 0.10 
?rp All 0.80 
?rg All 0.80 
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7 For more details on the coupling procedure see Sceia (2010).
models complemented by a technological representation of a specific sector such 
a electricity generation (Wing, 2006) or specific industrial processes (Murphy, 
Rivers, and Jaccard, 2007; Schumacher and Sands, 2007). More complete 
integrations in a single modeling framework have been proposed by Frei, Haldi, 
and Sarlos (2003), Böhringer and Rutherford (2008) or Böhringer and 
Rutherford (2009) but are so far only implemented with stylized models.
Compared to previous studies (Sceia et al., 2011, 2009), our coupling pro-
cedure has been amended to allow GEMINI-E3 to calculate taxes according to 
given sectoral emission profiles. The models are run alternatively while the cou-
pling variables are exchanged between the models, as shown in Figure 4, until a 
defined threshold on the variation of the taxes is reached.7 The coupling proce-
dure also takes into account a building improvement program (see Section 4.1.3 
for details).
3. Baseline Scenario
The GEMINI-E3 model with the disaggregated transportation sectors, once 
linked to the MARKAL-CHRES and MARKAL-CHTRA models and cali-
brated to Swiss GDP and population figures, calculates a baseline scenario until 
2030. For Switzerland, the GDP growth rate is in line with the Secretariat of 
Economic Affairs (SECO) estimates and is equal to 1.2% per year, whereas for 
other regions, they mainly follow forecasts from Energy Information Admin-
istration (2008), whereby world annual growth amounts to 2.8%.
The baseline oil prices are also a key assumption for the model. We use a 
smoothed series of historical prices and keep the oil prices at 50 USD2008/bbl 
until 2020. The price of oil is then assumed to grow linearly to 100 USD2008/bbl 
in 2050, thus reaching 66 USD2008/bbl in 2030. For Switzerland, the calibration 
of the model with regard to the combustible fuels consumption is made assum-
ing that temperatures will correspond to the average over the years 1970–1992.
In our baseline scenario, the world GHG emissions reach a little more than 55 
GtCO2eq by 2030, which is in line with OECD (2008). Figure 5 presents the 
GHG emissions for each region until 2030.
Table 2 presents the variations of the Swiss baseline emissions for the trans-
port, residential and emission trading system (ETS) sectors (Refined Petro-
leum, Electricity, Mineral Products, Chemical Rubber Plastic, Metal and Metal 
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Products and Paper Products Publishing) as well as the emissions from air trans-
port (national and international) and all other CO2 emissions. It also presents 
the variation of all emissions which will be subject to the CO2 tax on combusti-
ble fuels, i.e. those from the residential sector and those from the other sectors. 
On average, the Swiss baseline GHG emissions will decrease annually by 0.6%. 
Note that this reduction is comparable to the one of Japan, which has a similar 
GDP growth (Energy Information Administration, 2008). The calibration 
of the baseline emissions is based on Swiss Federal Office of Energy (2007) 
Scenario I.A, which assumes the continuation of present climate policies and the 
construction of new nuclear power plants to replace those that will be phased 
out over the coming decades.
The baseline reduction of GHG emissions in Switzerland is explained by 
four major factors: (1) moderate GDP growth, (2) increasing energy efficiency, 
(3) the continuation of existing climate policies and (4) oil prices reaching 
Figure 4: Coupling Schema
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Figure 5: Baseline CHG Emissions (GtCO2eq)
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Table 2: Variation of the Baseline GHG Emissions
Emissions 2020 2030 
in 1990a (% of 1990) 
Transport 12.3 9 10 
Households 8.4 15 22 
Transport sectors 3.9 –4 –17 
Residential 11.3 –17 –28 
ETS Sectors 5.4 –16 –22 
Other sectors 15.5 –5 –18 
Air transport 4.3 –6 –17 
Other 11.2 –5 –18 
Domestic CO2 44.6 –6 –13 
Domestic CO2 (w/o Air transport) 40.2 –6 –13 
Combustible fuels 22.5 –11 –23 
Other GHG 8.2 –9 –11 
CH4 4.3 –24 –27 
N2O 3.6 –24 –25 
Fluorinated gases 0.2 476 489 
Domestic GHG emissions 52.8 –6 –13 
a in MtCO2eq.
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8 For more information about the Energy Modeling Forum see http://emf.stanford.edu.
66 USD2008/bbl in 2030. The next section presents the policy scenarios which 
are envisaged to further reduce Swiss GHG emissions.
4. Policy Scenarios
4.1 Swiss Scenarios
Two scenarios are under consideration, a first one where international agreements 
target rather limited abatement, and a second one where stronger abatement is 
agreed upon by all world nations. Since no specific threshold allowing to differ-
entiate the two cases has yet been defined, we define two sets of international 
abatement targets (see Section 3.2) using expert judgment and the scenarios of 
the Energy Modeling Forum8 22 (Clarke et al., 2009).
The envisaged Swiss post-Kyoto policies, described in detail in Table 3, are 
not aimed at achieving a first best optimum but rather take into account the 
specificities and interests of the various stakeholders that will be affected by the 
policies. Indeed, the policies divide the economy in four parts, which will face 
different carbon prices.
4.1.1 Taxes, Levies and CO2 Markets
The energy intensive sectors (ETS sectors) will participate as of 2013 in an ETS 
similar to the European Union (EU) ETS (Böhringer, Rutherford, and Tol, 
2009a; Tol, 2009) and they will be allowed to purchase a part of the required 
abatement through the purchase of certified emissions reductions (CER) abroad. 
Our model simplifies the original policy requirement in four ways. Firstly, the 
future policies envisage that only large companies will participate in the emis-
sion trading whereas we assume that the totality of the sector takes part in the 
trading. Secondly, the companies taking part in the ETS might have the pos-
sibility not only to purchase CERs on the international market but also Euro-
pean Union Allowances (EUA) on the EU-ETS in case the ETS and EU-ETS 
are linked. We model a single international carbon market and therefore make 
no distinction between CER and EUA. Thirdly, similarly to the EU-ETS (Hep-
burn et al., 2006;, Demailly and Quirion, 2006), it is envisaged that 80% 
of the allowances are distributed at first according to grand-fathering and only 
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progressively the auctioned share grows to 70% in 2020 . We assume that 100% 
of the allowances are auctioned as of 2013. Fourthly, we only consider emissions 
related to the use of fossil fuels, i.e. CO2 emissions from cement production, other 
than those resulting from the use of fossil fuels to produce heat, are not counted.
The transport sectors are potentially affected by two instruments. Firstly, as of 
2010, the importers of transportation fuels will be required to offset a part of the 
transport emissions through the purchase of CERs. Assuming that the additional 
costs due to the purchase of the certificates will be passed on to the consumers 
through an increase in the price of transport fuels, we have modeled this through 
the implementation of a levy (tax), whose revenues are sufficient to purchase the 
required amount of foreign certificates. Secondly, in order to ensure a minimum 
domestic abatement the sum of the purchases from the ETS and transport sec-
tors is limited. Therefore, if the total cap on the purchase of CERs (i.e. the sum 
of the ETS and transport sectors purchases) is reached and taking into account 
Table 3: Swiss Emissions Targets
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
ETSa 
Certificates purchase capb (% of ETS 
abatement) 
–1.75 % p.a. 
40 
–2.9 % p.a. 
50 
Transportc (% of 1990 CO2 emissions) –25 –42 –40 –60 
Technical regulations on carsd target on average emissions of new cars
Combustible fuelsc (% of 1990  
CO2 emissions) 
–25 –33 –35 –50 
Building improvement programe
(2010-2020) 
200 Mio. CHF p.a. 
Resulting overall target (% of 1990  
GHG Emissions) 
–21 –31 –30 –45 
Total certificates purchase capc 
(% of 1990 GHG Emissions) 
9 14 14 21 
a Starts in 2013 on the basis of the average emissions in the period 2008-2012.
b The cap on the purchase of certificates in the ETS sectors increase linearly over the periods 
2010-2020 and remains unchanged from 2020-2030.
c The values of the objectives increase linearly over the periods 2010-2020 and 2020-2030.
d Modeled as a ban on standard cars as of 2015.
e Modeled as a discount on refurbishment costs (energy saving technologies).
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9 In the baseline, the 130 gCO2/km target is met in the year 2015. The 95 gCO2/km target is 
not met, although the average emission intensity of new cars continues to decline and reaches 
around 115 gCO2/km by 2030.
that the ETS sectors have the priority in the purchase mechanism, a CO2 tax will 
be introduced on transportation fuels to ensure achieving the abatement target 
of the transportation sectors.
As for the current CO2-Law, combustible fuels will continue to be subject to a 
tax. Nevertheless an exemption will be introduced for those sectors taking part 
in the ETS. Finally, air transport is not subject to any constraint.
In order to evaluate the relative efficiency of the envisaged scenarios, we have 
also simulated the implementation of a uniform CO2 tax, applied to the whole 
economy except from air transport, aimed at achieving equal domestic and total 
reductions.
In addition to the various economic instruments, two specific programs 
will also contribute to the overall Swiss abatement effort: an average emission 
target for the CO2 emissions of new passenger cars and a building improvement 
program.
4.1.2 Car Regulations
Both policies under consideration envisage an average emission target value for 
the CO2 emissions of new passenger cars, with the same requirements as those 
that will be imposed in the EU (European Commission, 2009b). The aver-
age emissions of new cars will be limited to 130 gCO2/km as of 2012 and to 95 
gCO2/km in 2020
9.
Despite the technological richness of the MARKAL-CHTRA model, the 
descriptions of the available and future vehicles does not go into sufficient details 
to model precisely this aspect of the policy. Instead, as of 2015, we have imple-
mented a technical restriction on the purchase of the less efficient diesel and 
gasoline personal cars (5.4 l/100km and 6.1 l/100km). This leaves the follow-
ing choices to the consumers: gas internal combustion engines (ICE) cars (8.2 
l/100km), efficient diesel and gasoline ICE cars (5.1, 5.8 l/100km), as well as 
hybrid cars using gas, diesel and gasoline (6.2, 4.2, 4.9 l/100km). As MARKAL 
models are perfect foresight models, due to anticipations, the restrictions have 
an effect before their implementation and, already in 2013, approximately one 
half million tons of CO2 are avoided. The abatement achieved by this measure 
exceeds 1.1 MtCO2 in 2020, which represents respectively 26% and 18% of the 
required transport sector abatement efforts in scenarios 1 and 2.
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4.1.3 Building Improvement Program
In the period 2010–2020, the revenue of the tax on combustible fuels will be 
affected up to one third of the total amount or maximum 200 Mio. CHF to a 
building improvement program, and the rest will be redistributed to households 
and economic sectors through social security. The building improvement pro-
gram consists of financial help from the government to undertake refurbishments 
of houses and buildings with the scope of improving their energy efficiency.
The use of a hybrid model with a bottom-up residential sector allows for mod-
eling endogenously this building improvement program. We have implemented 
a procedure which determines a reduction in the investment prices of energy 
saving technologies (e.g. insulation) as well as efficient technologies such as heat 
pumps or solar. This affects relative prices in MARKAL-CHRES and ensures 
that households increase their investments in these technologies. The price rebate 
is calculated so that the difference between the real costs of the investments and 
the actual costs borne by the households after the rebate is equal to the 200 Mio. 
CHF available for the program. In GEMINI-E3, we have considered that the 
government spends this amount in constructions (services sector). In view of the 
fact that our model has a single representative household that owns the capital, 
and assuming that companies would return the money to the capital owner, we 
have modeled the redistribution of the unspent revenue of the tax on combusti-
ble fuels as a simple lump-sum transfer.
When analyzed independently from all other instruments, we find that the 
building improvement program would save annually up to 680,000 tCO2 by 
2020, representing 23% and 15% of the abatement required in the residential 
sector in scenarios 1 and 2, at a shadow price of 295 CHF2010/tCO2eq.
4.2 International Scenarios
Climate policies will only be efficient in the long run if major agreements are 
found to limit emissions globally. There is no doubt that the historical responsi-
bility of climate change lies with developed countries and that it would be unfair 
to jeopardize the development process of the rest of the world. Nevertheless, it 
remains true that, without appropriate coordinated action of emerging nations, 
any efforts by the developed countries would be vain.
With that in mind, the level of emissions abatement to be included in the 
future Swiss policies will depend on involvement of the rest of the world in 
resolving the climate change problem. In this paper we consider two scenarios, 
where two different international agreements are agreed upon and enforced. 
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10 For simulations taking into account delayed participation or fragmented climate regimes see 
van Vuuren et al. (2009) and Hof, den Elzen, and van Vuuren (2009).
The proposed targets for the two scenarios for 2020 and 2030 are presented in 
Table 4. In the first scenario, a weak international agreement is reached, whereas 
the second scenario all countries more actively participate in the global effort. 
The second scenario is based on International Energy Agency (2009) where 
DCS get binding targets as of 2020. World emissions in 2030 would be approx-
imately at the level of 2001. Figures 6 and 7 show the international abatement 
targets for both scenarios.
Table 4: International Emissions Targets (% of 2001 Emissions)
Target year 2020 2030 
Scenario 1 2 1 2
CHE –21 –30 –31 –45
EUR –20 –30 –30 –45
OEC –20 –30 –30 –47
JAP –20 –30 –30 –47
OEU –a –10 –10 –23
DCS –a –a 0b –13b
a baseline emissions
b % of 2020 emissions
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all regions, except Switzerland, fully 
participate in a global emissions cap and trade system, allowing to equalize mar-
ginal abatement costs across all regions and providing a single world price for 
carbon10. When no binding target is defined for a region, we cap its emissions to 
the baseline emissions in order to avoid that the overall effect of the policies is 
jeopardized by carbon leakage.
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5. Results
5.1 Scenario 1
5.1.1 Carbon Prices and Emissions Reductions
Tables 5 and 6 present respectively the taxes that allow to achieve the objectives 
and the detailed emission abatements in the various parts of the Swiss economy. 
As expected, the levy collected on transport fuels to offset the emissions of the 
transport sector is small in view of the low price of foreign CO2 certificates. The 
Figure 6: Scenario 1 GHG Emissions Targets (GtCO2eq)
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Figure 7: Scenario 2 GHG Emissions Targets (GtCO2eq)
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additional combustible fuel tax is significant as it would have to reach approxi-
mately 137 CHF2010/tCO2eq by 2020 to obtain 25% abatement, despite the tech-
nical possibilities offered by MARKAL-CHRES and the building improvement 
program. The price of the allowances in the ETS market remains rather low in 
view of the fact that the baseline abatement in those sectors is quite pronounced 
already, leaving small additional abatement to meet the target. As a consequence, 
the ETS carbon price equals the international price of CERs.
Table 5: Swiss Environmental Taxes and Prices of Certificates/Allowances in Scenario 1 
(CHF2010/tCO2eq)
2013 2015 2020 2030
Transport CO2 tax 0.06 0.2 1 5 
Heating fuels tax 47 65 137 37 
ETS certificate price 1 2 4 13 
World certificate price 1 2 4 13 
Uniform tax 11 11 11 13 
The uniform tax presented in the last line of Table 5 allows for an equivalent 
total CO2 abatements as the combination of the tax, levy and ETS markets. It is 
determined with a cap on the purchase of CERs set at the level of one reached 
with the combination of the instruments and maintaining both the building 
improvement program and the technical regulations on cars.
The figures relative to abatement of the emissions due to combustible fuels 
and those from the residential sector in Table 6 suggest that modeling the use of 
combustible fuels in commercial buildings with an energy-systems model, as it 
is the case in the residential sector, would lower the estimation of the combus-
tible fuels tax. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that technologies available 
for residential buildings can to a large extent also be used for commercial build-
ings and that the tax should trigger a similar magnitude of abatement. Even if 
a part of the difference can be explained by the implementation of the building 
improvement program which triggers an abatement in the residential sector of 0.6 
MtCO2 and the fact that some industrial processes are still part of the other sec-
tors, the effect of the tax on the other sectors (-20%) seems rather limited when 
compared to the reductions in the residential sector (-47%).
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Table 6: Variation of the Swiss GHG Emissions in Scenarios 1 and 2 (% of 1990)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
1990a 2020 2030 2020 2030 
Transport 12.3 2 –3 2 –3 
incl. CER –25 –42 –40 –60 
Households 8.4 5 5 5 6 
Transport sectors 3.9 –5 –19 –6 –21 
Residential 11.3 –39 –47 –53 –75 
ETS Sectors 5.4 –18 –26 –20 –32 
incl. CER –23 –35 –30 –48 
Other sectors 15.5 –10 –19 –15 –23 
Air transport 4.3 –5 –17 –5 –16 
Other 11.2 –13 –20 –19 –26 
Domestic CO2 44.6 –15 –23 –21 –32 
Domestic CO2 (w/o Air transport) 40.2 –16 –23 –22 –33 
Combustible fuels 22.5 –26 –34 –36 –51 
Other GHG 8.2 –10 –10 –11 –11 
CH4 4.3 –25 –26 –27 –26 
N2O 3.6 –25 –25 –26 –26 
Fluorinated Gases 0.2 477 490 477 491 
Domestic GHG 52.8 –14 –21 –19 –28 
Total GHG 52.8 –21 –31 –30 –43 
a in MtCO2eq.
Both the transport and the ETS sectors can purchase CERs within predefined 
limits. Table 7 shows that in the first scenario the ETS sectors purchase a very 
limited amount of CERs to reach their target. In the transport sectors the small 
amount levied on fuel imports allows for the purchase of sufficient certificates 
to meet the 25% abatement target, but it is mainly the introduction of the regu-
lations on cars that triggers the domestic abatement that can be observed when 
comparing Tables 2 and 6. The purchase cap on CERs is not reached, indicat-
ing that the the ETS price and the transport fuels levy ensure sufficient domes-
tic abatement without having to impose an additional tax on transport fuels.
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11 See annex 6 for more detail on the calculation of the welfare components.
Table 7: Swiss Purchase of Certificates in Scenarios 1 and 2 (MtCO2eq)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Transport 3.3 4.8 5.1 7.0 
ETS 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.9 
Total 3.5 5.3 5.6 7.8 
Purchase cap 4.8 7.6 7.4 11.3 
%1990 GHG emissions 9% 14% 14% 21% 
5.1.2 Economic and Welfare Impacts
Table 8 presents the impacts on welfare (households’ surplus) as well as its decom-
position into the gains and losses of the terms of trade (GTT), the trade of emis-
sions permits and the deadweight loss of taxation (DWL)11. Furthermore, it pre-
sents the impacts of the uniform CO2 tax that would allow an equivalent total 
and domestic CO2 reductions. The welfare components are presented as a per-
centage of total households’ consumption (HC). In the first scenario, the impact 
of the climate policies on welfare is above a third of a percentage point. The DWL 
is the main element influencing the welfare as both the GTT and the capital 
transfers due to the purchases of permits remain limited.
The numbers in Table 8 also show that if a uniform CO2 tax is used instead of 
the combination of instruments, the resulting negative welfare effects are smaller. 
The difference between the two welfare effects can be seen as the loss of efficiency 
caused by the differentiation of the carbon price among sectors.
As expected, the overall impact of climate policies is negative for both pro-
duction and consumption. Nevertheless, some sectors are more affected than 
others and some even benefit from the policies. The most affected sector is the 
refined petroleum sector, whose demand from households drops by 29% in 2030. 
Such structural changes are obviously the aim of climate policies. The produc-
tion of refined petroleum products as well as imports are also quite strongly 
affected as they both decrease by approximately 10% compared to the baseline. 
In this scenario, the gas sector turns out to be the economically viable alterna-
tive to petroleum products. The households’ consumption of gas increase (66%) 
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is obviously supported by a strong increase of imports (39%). The electricity 
sector also strongly benefits from the policies and sees its production increase by 
almost 4% in 2030. In view of the small transport fuels levy, as expected, most 
transport sectors are only slightly negatively affected. The rail and road passen-
ger transport sectors do nevertheless slightly benefit from a slight reduction in 
personal car usage. Furthermore, pipeline transport production increases by up 
to 5.8% as it benefits from the increase in gas consumption.
Table 8: Economic Impacts of Scenarios 1 and 2 in Switzerland (% of HC)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
2020 2030 2020 2030 
Households’ Surplus –0.33 –0.34 –0.49 –0.47 
GTT 0.06 –0.03 0.14 0.09 
Sales of permits 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 –0.08 
Deadweight Loss –0.39 –0.29 –0.62 –0.47 
in case of uniform tax
Households’ Surplus –0.26 –0.34 –0.39 –0.43 
GTT –0.04 –0.08 0.09 0.06 
Sales of permits 0.00 –0.02 –0.01 –0.08 
Deadweight Loss –0.21 –0.24 –0.47 –0.41 
Each scenario having a specific international framework, it is interesting to say a 
word about international results despite the fact that they are not directly compa-
rable with those of Switzerland. The first scenario assumes that OEU and DCS 
are not subject to emissions caps (other than their baseline emission) before 2020. 
As a consequence, both of these regions are in a position to sell CERs and have 
therefore positive welfare effect. The effects in other regions are smaller than in 
Switzerland, as the price of carbon is equal across sectors, no minimal share of 
domestic abatement is imposed and all GHGs are included in policies. In view 
of the small price of world certificates, the Swiss welfare losses are mainly due 
to the combustible fuels tax which is a purely national measure and is therefore 
not connected to the international emissions certificates market (see Figure 11).
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5.1.3 The Residential and Transport Sectors
The coupled MARKAL-CHRES and MARKAL-CHTRA models allow us to 
analyze the technological implications of the scenarios more in detail.
Figure 8 shows that in the residential sector the combination of the combusti-
ble fuel tax and the building improvement program reduce both the heating oil 
and gas usage by respectively 14% and 66% compared to the baseline in 2030. 
Except in existing multi-family houses where the use of heating oil remains pre-
dominant, electric heat pumps become the predominant technology for space 
heating, which triggers the major part of the increase of electricity use (21% com-
pare to the baseline). The instruments also trigger an increase of 9% in the use 
of insulation and other energy saving technologies.
Figure 9 presents the passenger cars usage by car types in billion vehicle kil-
ometers per year(bvkm/a) and shows that the car regulations have a significant 
impact on the composition of the vehicle fleet. The increase of gas powered vehi-
cle is responsible for the increase of gas consumption by households as it largely 
compensates the decrease observed in the residential sector. The regulations also 
trigger an increased presence of all types of hybrid cars.
5.2 Scenario 2
The second scenario targets a total reduction of GHG emissions by 30% in 2020 
and 44% in 2030 using the instruments presented in Table 3.
5.2.1 Carbon Prices and Emissions Reductions
Tables 9 and 6 present respectively the taxes that allow to achieve the objectives 
of scenario 2 and the detailed emissions abatements in the various parts of the 
Swiss economy. The levy collected on transport fuels, despite being up to five 
time higher than in the first scenario, remains at very reasonable levels as the price 
of foreign emission certificates remains low. Such a levy would trigger an increase 
in the price of gasoline of approximately 1.9 cents per liter. The combustible fuels 
tax is expected to increase strongly if an abatement of 35% by 2020 is desired. 
Indeed, achieving such a strong domestic abatement over a single decade would 
require significant incentives and despite the building improvement program a 
tax on combustible fuels reaching 294 CHF2010/tCO2 would be necessary. As in 
the first scenario, the price of allowances in the ETS market remains rather low, 
in view of the moderate abatement compared to the baseline and because of the 
possibility to undertake 50% of this abatement abroad through the purchase of 
cheap emission certificates, in particular before 2020. By 2030 the certificates 
368 Sceia / Altamirano-Cabrera / Vielle / Weidmann
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2012, Vol. 148 (2)
Fi
gu
re
 8
: B
as
el
in
e 
/ 
Sc
en
ar
io
 1
 /
 S
ce
na
ri
o 
2 
Fu
el
 M
ix
es
 in
 t
he
 R
es
id
en
ti
al
 S
ec
to
r 
(P
J)
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
25
0
20
0
15
0
10
0 50 0
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
25
0
20
0
15
0
10
0 50 0
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
25
0
20
0
15
0
10
0 50 0
Ba
se
lin
e
Sc
en
ar
io
 1
Sc
en
ar
io
 2
En
er
gy
 sa
vi
ng
s
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
R
en
ew
ab
le
s
G
as
D
ie
se
l
Assessment of Acceptable Swiss post-2012 Climate Policies 369
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2012, Vol. 148 (2)
Fi
gu
re
 9
: B
as
el
in
e 
/ 
Sc
en
ar
io
 1
 /
 S
ce
na
ri
o 
2 
U
se
 o
f P
er
so
na
l C
ar
s 
by
 T
yp
es
 (b
vk
m
/a
)
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
10
0 80 60 40 20 0
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
10
0 80 60 40 20 0
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
10
0 80 60 40 20 0
G
as
 H
yb
rid
G
as
D
ie
se
l H
yb
rid
D
ie
se
l
G
as
ol
in
e 
H
yb
rid
G
as
ol
in
e
Ba
se
lin
e
Sc
en
ar
io
 1
Sc
en
ar
io
 2
370 Sceia / Altamirano-Cabrera / Vielle / Weidmann
Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 2012, Vol. 148 (2)
would reach 47 CHF2010/tCO2. Figure 10 presents the domestic emissions for the 
various sectors and confirms that the share of emissions caused by motor fuels 
increases significantly from 23% in 1990 to 29% in 2030. Combustible fuels, 
ETS sectors excluded, see their share shrink from 43% to 36%.
Table 9: Swiss Environmental Taxes and Prices of Certificates/Allowances in Scenario 2 
(CHF2010/tCO2eq)
2013 2015 2020 2030 
Transport CO2 tax 0.33 0.9 4 28 
Heating fuels tax 76 114 294 207 
ETS certificate price 3 5 9 47 
World certificate price 3 5 9 47 
Uniform tax 48 72 159 126 
Figure 10: Domestic Swiss GHG Emissions (MtCO2eq)
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The tax on combustible fuels seems particularly high when compared to the uni-
form tax that would allow an equal domestic and total reduction of emissions 
and might trigger questions on the social equity aspects of the envisaged policies. 
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Figure 11 shows clearly that the transport sector contributes greatly to achiev-
ing the overall objective in both scenarios, but to a very large extent through the 
purchase of CERs. The tax on combustibles fuels achieves 65% of the domestic 
abatement in 2030 and when adding the contribution of the building improve-
ment program this share rises to 75%. When considering the total emissions 
reductions, 77% is achieved by the combustible fuels tax and the purchases of 
CER by the transport sector.
Figure 11: Net Swiss GHG Emissions, CER Purchases and Abatements  
by Responsible Instrument (MtCO2eq)
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Regarding the purchase of emission certificates by the transport and the ETS 
sectors, Table 7 shows that, similarly to the first scenario, the overall emission 
cap is not reached and as a consequence no additional tax on transport fuels 
is required. The purchase of foreign emission certificates by the transport fuel 
importers financed by the levy reaches 7.8 tCO2eq in 2030, which represents 
approximately 15% of 1990 emissions. As in the previous scenario the domestic 
abatement in the transport sector is attributable to the regulations on passenger 
cars rather than to the small increase of transportation fuels’ prices.
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5.2.2 Economic and Welfare Impacts
Table 8 presents the impacts of scenario 2 on welfare. As expected, the impact 
on welfare is more substantial than in the first scenario. The DWL reaches 0.6% 
of households’ consumption in 2020 and the gains of the terms of trade are not 
sufficient to offset this. Again, the comparison with the uniform tax case con-
firms that setting up instruments which lead to differentiated marginal costs of 
abatement is suboptimal in terms of welfare. In view of the low prices of foreign 
emission certificates, the influence of their purchase on welfare remains low.
As expected, the overall impact of climate policies on both production and con-
sumption is negative and stronger than in the previous scenario. The strongest 
effect is on the petroleum products sector, which is significantly affected (-18% 
of production in 2030), mainly because of a strong decrease in final consump-
tion (-46%). When comparing with the previous scenario, with higher taxes gas 
turns out to be less of a viable substitute to petroleum products and therefore the 
substitution toward electricity is stronger. Gas consumption nevertheless increases 
by more than 50% and electricity consumption jumps by almost 40%. The elec-
tricity sector is the major beneficiary in this scenario as it increases its produc-
tion by 6.7% in 2030. Again, the air transport sector is very slightly affected as 
it does not face any carbon price.
From the international perspective, the second scenario assumes stronger 
abatements and international agreements that would involve in the long run all 
regions with specific emissions reductions. By 2020, nevertheless, it is expected 
that DCS would only be restricted to their baseline emissions and, as a conse-
quence, it is the only region selling large amounts of CER and therefore enjoy-
ing welfare gains. Switzerland is more affected than other regions before 2020, 
with the exception of OEU which is extremely sensitive to climate policies in 
view of its energy and energy intensive goods exports. In 2030, compared to 
Switzerland, EUR and OEC face stronger welfare effects, due in particular to 
a greater baseline GDP growth that leads to greater emissions increases com-
pared to the base year.
5.2.3 The Residential and Transport Sectors
Figure 8 shows that the high tax on combustible fuels combined to the building 
improvement program reduces the use of gas and diesel in the residential sector 
by respectively 90% and 57% in 2030 compared to the baseline. The use of elec-
tric heat pumps, which have an energy efficiency three to four time superior to 
conventional diesel boilers, allows compensating a large share of the final energy 
demand and increases the use of electricity by 50%. The rest of the final energy 
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is compensated by an increase of 44% in the use of renewables and an additional 
installation of energy saving technologies (19%).
Figure 9 shows that only the car regulation influence the personal cars fleet 
composition. Indeed, the limited amount of the levy remains without effect for 
the personal cars. The use of the uniform tax does not further affect the personal 
cars fleet and has no impact of other parts of the transport sector, which are very 
inelastic over the time horizon until 2030.
6. Conclusions
The use of hybrid and coupled models in the framework of the economic assess-
ment of climate policies is increasingly popular and this study underlines the 
benefits of this methodology. It also presents an innovative soft-coupling pro-
cedure between a world CGE model (GEMINI-E3) and two energy-systems 
models (MARKAL-CHRES and MARKAL-CHTRA) modeling specifically 
the Swiss residential and transport sectors. Linking the models allows modeling 
the numerous aspects of the future climate policies, which can be of both tech-
nical and economic nature.
Our coupled model simulates all the different policy instruments that are 
envisaged in Switzerland for the post-Kyoto period endogenously and therefore 
allows analyzing both envisaged scenarios in different international frameworks. 
In the first scenario, we simulate moderate abatement targets with weak and 
incomplete international agreement, whereas the second scenario aims at more 
stringent abatement in the case where stronger international abatement objec-
tives would be agreed upon.
Our simulations show that both policies have moderate economic impacts on 
the Swiss economy. In the first scenario, the various instruments would trigger 
a loss of welfare of about a third of a percent in 2020. In the second scenario, 
the maximum welfare loss would reach half percent in the same period. With 
a model that would consider induced technical progress and first-mover advan-
tages, those economic impacts should be even lower. Furthermore, the welfare 
costs do not account for the avoided damages due to climate change, the poten-
tial adaptation costs or the ancillary benefits such as the avoided local air pollu-
tion. Nevertheless, we also show that welfare costs of mitigation could be further 
reduced by the introduction of a uniform tax.
Two major factors affect the efficiency of climate policies. On the one hand, 
within a given country, the necessity to differentiate the carbon prices faced 
by different sectors is generally defended by arguments related to international 
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competitiveness and carbon leakage. Grubb, Azar, and Persson (2005) pin-
pointed that concerns about competitiveness led to excessive generosity for some 
sectors in the first phase of the EU-ETS allocation. In our framework, we show 
that while ensuring the global emissions abatement levels, thus avoiding leak-
age, the competitiveness argument does not hold in Switzerland. Indeed, Swiss 
welfare suffers from the advantage given to transport and ETS industries by the 
introduction of the diversified instruments and overgenerous caps on CERs pur-
chases. On the other hand, national restrictions on the purchase of CERs are a 
major factor affecting the efficiency of climate policies but they are necessary 
from the perspective of international equity. In the Swiss case, all sectors facing 
the combustible tax are deprived from using any sort of flexibility mechanism, 
thus increasing the cost of emissions abatement.
Both scenarios trigger an important switch away from petroleum products. 
In the first scenario, this turns out to be very beneficial for the gas sector that 
profits from the increase of gas internal combustion engine (ICE )and hybrid 
personal car. In the second scenario, a doubling of the tax on combustible fuels 
pushes further toward the use of electricity in the residential sector. Both poli-
cies generate gains from the terms of trade but they do not offset the deadweight 
loss of taxation.
Interestingly, in both scenarios the caps on the purchase of foreign emission 
certificates are not reached. The implications are twofold. On the one hand, the 
envisaged tax on transport fuels is not necessary to ensure the minimum domes-
tic abatement and, on the other hand, additional purchases of certificates, par-
ticularly in the residential sector, would be possible without jeopardizing the 
domestic emissions targets.
From the technology perspective, we show that the demand for private cars is 
very inelastic to the price of transport fuels and that the car regulations are the 
only instrument affecting the personal cars fleet composition. The car regula-
tions are responsible for a strong presence of hybrid cars and gas cars in general. 
This might be significantly different if additional vehicles types, in particular per-
sonal cars such as plug-in hybrids and electric, would be included in MARKAL-
CHTRA. As expected, the high taxes in the residential sector trigger a switch 
away from diesel and gas in favor of renewables and electricity, mainly thanks to 
the installation of efficient heat pumps.
In conclusion, both scenarios seem realistic and do not have dramatic impacts 
on the Swiss economy. This is due partly to the fact that in both scenarios the 
price of foreign emission certificates remains relatively low, allowing for cheap 
offsetting of Swiss emissions in transport and ETS industries. Nevertheless, the 
comparison with the uniform tax confirms that Swiss society as a whole would be 
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better off without the differentiation of the economic instruments between dif-
ferent sectors. Nevertheless, such differentiation is aimed at increasing the accept-
ability of climate policies, and, as shown in Fredriksson (1997), the deviation 
from an optimal pollution tax can be explained by the influence of lobby groups.
One important weakness of our assessment is related to the uncertainties sur-
rounding the assumptions on which our work is based. There are different sources 
of uncertainties, some are linked to exogenous assumptions (like GDP growth 
and world energy prices), others are related to the cost of technologies that are 
into account (in Markal or in GEMINI-E3 (through elasticities of substitution 
or the nested CES functions)), finally the climate target is itself uncertain. In 
Haurie, Tavoni, and van der Zwaan (2011) the authors stress several recom-
mendations to integrate uncertainties in modeling climate policies, in the case 
of Computable General Equilibrium models one solution is to use Monte Carlo 
simulations, this option for example has been applied to the GEMINI-E3 model 
in Babonneau et al. (2011).
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Appendix
Welfare Costs
Similarly to other general equilibrium models, GEMINI-E3 assesses the wel-
fare costs of policies through the measurement of the classical Dupuit’s surplus, 
i.e. in the modern formulation the Equivalent Variation of Income (EVI) or the 
Compensating Variation of Income (CVI). It is well acknowledged that surplus 
is to be preferred to changes in GDP or changes in Households’ Final Consump-
tion because these aggregates are measured at constant prices, according to the 
methods of National Accounting, and do not capture a main effect of climate 
change policies that is the change in the structure of prices. Moreover, it is highly 
informative to split the welfare costs in its three components: the Deadweight 
Loss of Taxation (DWL), the Gains from Terms of Trade (GTT) and the net 
revenue resulting from the trade of of emission certificates (CE).
Decomposition of the welfare costs is a complex issue that has been addressed 
in the literature, mainly by Böhringer and Rutherford (2002, 2004) in the 
case of climate change policy, and by Harrison, Horridge, and Pearson 
(2000) in a more general framework. In this study, we aim at an approximate 
decomposition providing for a general idea of the relative importance of each 
component. This is justified by the fact that the changes in prices, in particular 
the prices of foreign trade, are fairly small. Table 10 presents the various steps 
allowing for the decomposition. In practice, we first calculate the surplus in line 
with the specification of the utility function. Then we approximate the GTT 
and calculate CE, to finally obtain the DWL by difference between the welfare 
gains and GTT plus CE12.
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Table 10: Measurement and Components of Welfare
S ? R ? ?CVI
Total Welfare Gain ? Variation of Income ? Compensative Variation of Income
? ?DWL ? GTT ? CE
?? Deadweight Loss of Taxation ? Gains from Terms of Trade ? Net Trade of Certificates
GTT ? ?Exp0?Pexp ? ?Imp0?Pimp
SUMMARY
In the framework of the revision of the Swiss CO2-Law and in the preparation of 
the international negotiations that place at the Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Swiss Govern-
ment has proposed a set of instruments and two levels of abatement to define 
the Swiss climate policy for the post-2012 period. By 2030, Switzerland would 
recuce its GHG emission by 30% or 45%, depending on whether or not the rest 
of the world world would commit to strong emissions reductions. The proposed 
policies are the result of consultation procedures take into account the views of 
major stakeholders and lobbies and allow for differienciated carbon prices in dif-
ferent sectors of the Swiss economy. Linking a Cumputable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) and two sectoral energy models, we evaluate the policies for the two sce-
narios. We find important disparities in the prices of carbon faced by the differ-
ent economic sectors and higher welfare costs than those that would be triggered 
by a uniform carbon tax.
